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British Catholics’ Commercial Strategies in Times of International Warfare (1688-1705) 
 
This article investigates the British Catholic merchants’ commercial strategies during the Nine Years War (1689-1697) 
and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713). By focusing on the tactics deployed by John Aylward and his 
partners in France and England, I argue that Catholicism fundamentally sustained Aylwards’ trade by ensuring access 
to various markets and safer commercial plans. Catholicism had an economic dimension and Catholics in trade proved 
non-communal, working with co-religionists, family but also with non-Catholics in order to pursue profits. This paper 
tells us how Catholicism, despite being a political and social impairment, was the key to success in commerce. It 
contributes to recent scolarship on religious minorities in trade and on how commerce functioned in the English Channel 
and in European waters at times of warfare. 
 
The early modern commercial world fundamentally transformed European society by introducing a 
new set of values and norms, that among others, profoundly affected the religious discourse as well; 
in fact, the commercial age forced religious minorities to adopt a new economic rationale which 
fostered cross-cultural or inter-faith networks. Long-distance commerce opened communal 
minorities to cooperation with traders with ‘no blood, kinship or ethnic ties’, as the difficulty to 
monitor such vast exchanges and the pursuit of profits ‘brought strangers into contact’.
1 This theory exemplifies the strategies of British Catholic merchants involved in Mediterranean and 
Atlantic trade in the early modern period. They worked with co-religionists as well as Protestants. 
Decades of co-operation would eventually bring social and political rehabilitation for British 
Catholics at the end of the eighteenth century.  
This paper builds upon these recent findings and investigates the trading rationale of the British 
Catholic merchant John Aylward. Although a single case study, the Aylward papers offer a vast 
amount of information on how religious minorities acted in trade and how the early modern 
commercial world functioned. Aylward did not act in isolation and his activities suggest that 
Catholicism had an economic dimension and Catholic merchants fostered global networks of inter-
faith trade within the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Furthermore, they defy the stereotype of 
communality as Aylward and his associates tapped into religious and blood relations alongside 
wider economic connections.2 In fact, this paper focuses on Aylward’s commercial strategies during 
the turmoil of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. By investigating his activities, the 
aim is to show how Catholic merchants built inter-imperial networks in order to survive the war by 
exchanging north-European manufactures for Mediterranean goods. By tapping into networks of 
Catholics, family and Protestant associates, Aylward created global circuits. Furthermore, during 
the two decades examined, from France and England Aylward traded primarily through smuggling 
and privateering. Therefore, his dealings enrich the historiography on commercial strategies during 
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warfare, particularly on privateering in the English Channel, on which developments has only just 
begun. This will also contribute to a deeper understanding of European trade during the Nine Years 
War (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714).  
The Aylward papers examined here are a part of a wider collection held in Arundel Castle Archive. 
The vast amount of business papers span from the 1670s to the 1720s and records the commercial 
activities of the Aylwards, both male and female. Although focusing on one family, the incredible 
amount of names and information allow us to reconstruct the strategies of British Catholics on a 
macro-global level and the political and social norms with which they operated. They prove how 
British Catholics were entrepreneurs and active players in Atlantic and European trade.  
The first business records of John Aylward start in 1672 in Malaga, Spain. He was a general import-
export merchant and banker of Irish origin. The Irish Genealogist records John Aylward as a 
merchant of St Malo.3 However, his family was from Waterford, Ireland, and part of the Irish 
diaspora that left the country during the Cromwellian War. They were possibly part of the Anglo-
Irish community settled in London, but it is not clear where Aylward was born. What is certain is 
that in 1672 he moved to Malaga, where he stayed until 1687. There, he met his wife Helena Porter, 
daughter of a merchant of Irish origin, Matthew Porter, and widow of the trader Jacques de la Herse 
Trublet, probably of St Malo. They married on 27th April 1687 and had three daughters. One of 
them, Marie-Alsen married on February 1708 to Henry Charles Howard of Greystoke. Their son, 
Charles, would become 10th Duke of Norfolk in 1777. In 1687, Aylward moved to St Malo, where 
he stayed until 1698, when he settled down in London. He died in London on the 24th of April 1705, 
leaving his wife to administer his legacy.4   
In the 1670s, Aylward started as a trader in the Anglo-Spanish trade, the most profitable at the 
time.5 There he moved between Malaga and Cadiz where he found easy acceptance in the 
mercantile community of Catholic expatriates.6 Initially his business accounts showed average 
trading activity with incomes and losses typical of any merchant involved in that trade. Since the 
beginnings, Aylward showed non-communality in his exchanges, working with anyone deemed 
trustworthy and in actuality he closed the most lucrative deals with non-Catholics.  
He started as an associate of the merchant house Power & Hill, one of the many English houses that 
operated in the Anglo-Spanish market between Cadiz and London. This firm was well established 
with interests that spanned from Europe to the West Indies and it helped Aylward to gain a foothold 
in the Atlantic trade. Through this house he was introduced to a vast network of merchants based in 
various European ports. The 1670s-80s were formative years in which Aylward learned how to 
trade and expanded his contacts. At that time, the most significant partnership was with the Porters, 
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his in-laws established in Cadiz and St Malo. The Catholic Porters were renowned Jacobite 
privateers with extensive networks across the European-Atlantic ports.7 Through them Aylward was 
introduced to his wife Helena Porter, and this union brought him a large amount of capital and 
access to vast mercantile networks.  
In 1687, Aylward moved to St Malo where he stayed until 1698. In France, he established himself 
as an independent merchant without however completely severing his ties with Power & Hill and all 
the contacts previously established in Spain. When he moved Aylward could not foresee that a 
decade of warfare would soon erupt. However, it would be during the Glorious Revolution (1688-
89) and the Nine Years War (1688-1697) that he realised how his Catholicism would sustain his 
business. Indeed, it was thanks to his Catholic ties that he was able to smuggle French goods into 
Spain and England in order to supply the transatlantic vessels. This first stage of warfare saw 
extensive privateering activity, particularly in the Channel. In the Anglo-French war privateering 
was possibly the main tactic of both parties and Aylward seized this opportunity, taking advantage 
of kin and religious ties.  
In 1698, he moved to London. There, during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714) his 
pragmatism allowed him to supply the English market with illegal French and Spanish products, 
again through contraband. The aim of his career was to continue supplying the Spanish transatlantic 
vessels in Cadiz and to fuel the Anglo-Spanish trade. As a merchant, his rationale was not unique. 
Any trader at that time, looking for profits, focused in Cadiz, the gateway of the Atlantic, with its 
constant flow of American bullion, West-Indian raw materials and Mediterranean and Levant 
goods. Therefore, there was no exceptionality in his decision to trade there. However, his 
distinctiveness lies in being a British Catholic merchant who prospered in a time of international 
warfare. Many of his decisions reflect communal behaviours such as marrying a Catholic woman or 
in collaborating with co-religionists and family. However, his activity enriches recent 
historiography on religious communities in trade and capitalist behaviour. He supports recent 
arguments that, by reinterpreting the Weber’s theory on Protestantism and capitalism, argue that 
instead of a unique work ethic, Protestant states favoured business through their legal and 
institutional systems.8 Indeed, Aylward found himself in the right context in which economic 
interests overcame religious discourse. By focusing on Aylward’s trading strategies from 1688 to 
1705, this article aims to shed light on the role played by British Catholics in the early modern trade 
and contribute to understanding how the commercial world functioned. 
Finally, Aylward also enriches Catholic historiography. Indeed, either scholars do not associate 
Catholics with trade or, if they do, they describe it as mainly communal or conducted for 
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ideological or political reasons.9 However, I believe that Aylward was not communal and he never 
engaged in privateering for political reasons. His religion was certainly part of his identity, but in 
times of international warfare it was mainly instrumental. He realised how Catholicism could secure 
better strategies and he seized this opportunity. In Britain Catholicism was a social impairment.10 
However, in trade it proved crucial to success, allowing access to various markets and international 
networks. Here, John Aylward used both his religion and his national identity. This narrative does 
not aim to undermine the religious dimension, but to emphasise how British Catholic merchants 
played a largely unrecognised but vital role within the Atlantic and Mediterranean economy. They 
did not reject their beliefs but, like Trivellato’s ‘Port Jews’, their religion coexisted with wider 
economic connections, as merchants acted ‘merely for money’.11  
 
I 
In 1688, the birth of the King James II’s son alarmed the English Protestant establishment. Indeed, 
the Catholic James II had already undermined the Protestant political power by trying to repeal the 
Test Act, which restricted all government posts to members of the Church of England. As a 
consequence, the birth of the new Prince of Wales, by ensuring the succession, could mean a return 
to Catholicism.12 Therefore, the Dutch William III, James II’s son-in law, was invited to intervene. 
The Dutch dreaded a possible alliance between James II and his cousin the Catholic French Louis 
XIV, a scenario that would have disrupted the European balance of power and British-Dutch 
commerce in Europe. But economic interests were much more important than the Catholic threat. In 
fact, France never hid its pretentions of a universal monarchy and Louis XIV’s territorial expansion 
met firm opposition from the Dutch and the English who would not have allowed the French 
monarch to become the new arbiter of Europe.13  Once the Glorious Revolution began, James II fled 
to France. In February 1689 William and Mary were declared sovereign, and shortly thereafter in 
the spring, war was declared against France in order to protect Anglo-Dutch economic interests. No 
one could foresee that this conflict would last for nine years in which France fought England, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Austria. Therefore, the international scene was grim and the prospects for 
European trade were not promising. Nevertheless, it was during this decade that Aylward’s business 
thrived. In actuality, the late 1680s and 1690s was the most profitable time of his career and his 
business boomed. He would amass a significant fortune that in later years would allow him to retire 
in country retreats and enjoy the springs in Bath.14  
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During the Glorious Revolution and the Nine Years War Aylward was in St Malo, one of the hubs 
of Channel privateering. There, he started to make use of his in-laws’ extensive networks; Indeed, 
Malouins privateers had vast global connections. They ventured across the Atlantic reaching South 
America, the Caribbean, Newfoundland, but also West Africa, China and Arabia. The import-export 
focused on English tin, lead, Irish provisions, cod and Breton linens. With England, in particular 
London and Bristol, the privateers of St Malo smuggled goods through the islands of Guernsey and 
Jersey.15 
During the war, the end of legitimate exchanges stimulated smuggling as for the English ports ‘the 
amputation of their French trade’ would have had detrimental consequences.16 Indeed, although 
under embargo, French goods continued to retain their value and to be in high demand. Moreover, 
at that juncture they were cheap since officially no one could export them. There was the possibility 
of great profits and Aylward’s ability to support them developed his career. He realised how 
Catholicism could be crucial for this trade and he seized the opportunity. In fact, thanks to the vast 
capital and wider networks of family and co-religionists introduced by his wife, he accessed the 
Channel privateering activities, and secured trade to English ports thanks to his Protestant partner. 
whereas, Spanish Catholic ties provided for the supply of the transatlantic vessels in Cadiz. Indeed, 
Aylward’s aim was to continue to meet the demand of the Spanish-American market, and for this 
reason he had left his nephew Robert Butler in Malaga with the task of supervising the supply of the 
flota and galleons.17 Nevertheless, in Spain Aylward corresponded with his firm Power & Hill since 
his nephew was not entirely reliable, having mismanaged his deals more than once. 
When the war erupted and French goods were embargoed, Aylward prepared new schemes on 
French imports to Spain and England. To Spain he thought about smuggling goods through 
Hamburg and Amsterdam by resorting to neutral vessels, usually Danish and Swedish. Indeed, 
Denmark and Sweden at the time were embroiled in Baltic conflicts against Russia and each other, 
and they did not side any party. The Allies failed to bring them into the blockade and these neutral 
vessels profited greatly from the French trade that the Dutch and the English had officially 
abandoned.  The main role of Sweden and Denmark was to provide convoys to protect allied 
cargoes in the Channel;18 whereas in order to introduce French goods to England Aylward resorted 
to privateering and his capital increased. The affairs in the Channel were orchestrated mainly with 
the Protestant Thomas Brailsford, an associate of Power & Hill, who was acquainted with Aylward 
since the 1680s.19 Nevertheless, it was in 1688-89 that they started corresponding. After the Anglo-
French war erupted Aylward realised that he needed an English non-Catholic partner to introduce 
his goods to London.  
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In those two years, Brailsford and Aylward exchanged many letters and it is striking how over the 
months a wide variety of different strategies were discussed. Privateering in the Channel was a 
common tactic of war at times of Anglo-French rivalries and both governments tacitly approved this 
business in order to damage the rival’s commercial interests. ‘Commercial warfare raised to new 
prominence’ in those years as both rivals found this naval war cheaper and more effective in 
damaging the enemy’s mercantile activities.20 For the merchants however it provided the 
opportunity to introduce goods officially embargoed. In fact, with the right documents and the right 
connections, Aylward and Brailsford closed excellent deals. Their interests were varied, ranging 
from fabrics, calicoes, dye products, and silver. Their success was in the ability to tap into inter-
imperial networks, as the Channel provided a flow of commodities coming from the Spanish 
Americas, the French West-Indies or the Levant and the Mediterranean. Their exchanges were vast 
involving the major transatlantic ports like London, Amsterdam, Bristol and Port Royal in Jamaica.  
As mentioned, the goods in which they invested were numerous and diverse, however, the most 
striking aspect of their correspondence is how those goods were dealt with. After the hostilities 
began, a customs war between France and England ensued. An embargo was issued on foreign 
ships and consequently smuggling flourished. In order to avoid the blockade, Brailsford and 
Aylward deployed various tactics. First they secured reliable ‘friends’ at the customhouse, as the 
support of the port administrator was essential for the smuggler to succeed.21 This friendship was 
usually quite expensive as apparently 100 guineas were necessary to ‘blind the eyes of some clarcks 
and prevent too much examination’. A significant amount if a vessel insurance of 20 or 30 guineas 
was deemed extremely expensive. 22 
However, the French imports were not necessarily arriving from France as at times they were first 
moved to Holland where Aylward worked with Catholic expatriates, particularly in Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam;23 from there the commodities would be introduced to Scotland or the north of England. 
The vessels used were mainly Danish as the country was not part of the hostilities and the captains 
were always given secret instructions, so that nobody knew where these vessels headed.24 
Another tactic was to resort to English or Dutch men-of-war and to fake a privateer’s assault on a 
French vessel in the Channel. This was one of the most common devices arranged by the two 
traders, as Dutch or English ships could access all the English ports.  Aylward’s role in this was to 
procure ‘the King of France’s pass’, permits necessary for the ships not to be taken beforehand by 
French privateers. The crew should have been English and possibly trusted ‘mates’. 
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At this initial stage, Aylward’s letters proved extremely accurate and show obsessive attention to 
detail. Every single stage of the exchange had to be thought carefully. Nothing was left unplanned, 
from the name of the vessel to the mark on the barrels. Any minimal inaccuracy could have caused 
the failure of the operation. Caution was never enough and privateering although institutionally 
sanctioned was a risky enterprise where losses as well as rewards could be sensational.25 
Interestingly it was all based on trust. Aylward and Brailsford were not related or part of the same 
religious community. That they did not share the same beliefs was openly suggested by Brailsford’s 
aversion to James II, when writing that he [the King] ‘endeavoured to subvert the Constitution of 
the Kingdom, […] by the advice of the Jesuits and other wicked persons’.26 Nevertheless, they had 
common economic interests and the desire to reap the profits of the Spanish transatlantic trade. 
They met as traders of the same counting house and for the sake of profits embarked in the same 
hazardous enterprise. By necessity Aylward resorted to non-communal networks. Undeniably, his 
business was built on circuits of family and co-religionists. Nevertheless, he was pragmatic and did 
not disregard non-Catholic partners if it was more profitable to trade with them. 
Brailsford never disappointed him and their cunning showed no bounds. In fact, during the summer 
of 1689, the situation escalated and even neutral vessels, such as the Danish or Portuguese, were 
seized by the English and Dutch privateers, if coming from France. The authorities knew that 
neutral cargo could conceal on board enemy’s property  and even English vessels were taken if 
crossing the Channel. 27 Aware of these high risks, Aylward and Brailsford decided to resort to yet 
another tactic: fishing, or more precisely fishing vessels. During the war, it was indeed fairly 
common for fishermen to support the smuggling effort in order to protect the commercial deals 
disrupted by the hostilities. Particularly in the Channel, fishermen on both sides maintained the 
contacts established in peace time and in ‘being friends of all nations’ defended the interest of the 
coastal communities.28 After obtaining the proper documents, and changing the vessels’ names in 
English, Aylward sent the ships from France to Faro in Portugal where the goods could be unloaded 
and moved to a fishing boat. The fishing boat arriving at Portugal would then go to Malaga where 
Brailsford would have registered the goods under his name. Then the cargo from Spain would have 
been freely admitted to England. 
 Among the various strategies, such as resorting to fishermen, bribes or fake seizure, Aylward and 
Brailsford also exchanged goods for prisoners. Again this was usual among merchants and Aylward 
resorted to this tactic more than once throughout the decades, always proving successful. The usual 
plan was to ask permission to return some English prisoners from France and to pay around 100 
crowns for each man. In return, they sent to Calais French prisoners held in England. Brailsford 
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would obtain the right documents from the ‘Kings Commission for Exchange of Prisoners’, 
whereas Aylward would buy an English vessel taken as a prize, and together with the men, he 
would send all sorts of goods, anything he deemed a ‘penny worth’.29 He also arranged to have the 
French passes to avoid French privateers, and he registered the bills of loading under Brailsford’s 
name. The latter would ensure safety from the English assaults. They carefully thought about any 
likely scenario and how to act accordingly.  
In this first stage of warfare, the Aylwards’ dynamics support the theory that Channel privateering 
flourished in times of warfare. That area was possibly the most strategic zone for Britain as the 
overseas trade would mainly access British ports through it.30 Indeed, from St Malo Aylward could 
access the French imperial markets and the Irish provisions, and exchange them for English fabrics 
to supply the flota and galleons in Cadiz. He maximised his profits by establishing inter-imperial 
networks and his success lies behind his religion. The opportunity to be based in France and to rely 
on Catholics in Spain assured him an advantage over his Protestant associates. He was extremely 
pragmatic and his religion ensured great profits in this first phase of warfare. 
Nevertheless, In the 1690s Aylward’s correspondence did not focus only on Channel privateering 
but also on the West-Indian trade between London, Bristol and Jamaica. His partners in Port Royal, 
the Halls sent hundreds of hogsheads of sugar and dyestuff, primarily indigo.31 The Halls were 
Brailsford’s family and had been involved in the Jamaican trade since the late 1670s when Power & 
Hill kept accounts of African slaves sold by Henry Hall. Aylward mainly corresponded with 
William and Francis, possibly Henry’s sons. He must have been introduced to them by Brailsford 
because before the 1680s there was no correspondence with them. During the first years of the Nine 
Years War, the Halls moved between Port Royal and London, supervising the shipment of Irish 
beef, pork, butter, and returning with cargoes of West-Indian sugar, indigo, pimento and 
brasilwood. Aylward supervised the Irish deals and he was warned to be careful about his agents as 
it was quite common to mix pickles with ‘old beef and pork’, selling them as fresh. Direct 
correspondence with the Halls proved crucial since from Port Royal, they provided the most up-to-
date information about which commodities were in demand and which were better avoided.  
They also monitored the movements of the Spanish galleons, often sharing with Aylward their 
concerns as the war might have stopped or hinder the exchanges. The only advice was to ‘hitt the 
naile while it is hot’.32 Indeed, The Halls lamented that the Atlantic trade was a lottery; however it 
was potentially extremely lucrative. Clearly Aylward agreed as he tapped into this trade from the 
1670s and left part of the family in Cadiz to monitor the arrival and departure of the fleet and to 
control the quality of the merchandise supplied. 
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In the south of Spain Aylward’s main agent was his nephew, Butler. As a Catholic he found 
welcoming policies and he could tap into networks of Catholic expatriates based there. Thanks to 
Butler, in the 1690s Aylward monitored and supplied the transatlantic vessels with French and 
English products. Until the late 1680s when Aylward left Malaga, his nephew had proved nothing 
but a source of great concern, but during the early 1690s he showed some abilities. For more than a 
year, they exchanged a vast correspondence under pseudonyms, adopting the Dutch sounding 
names of Van Holstein and Jacob Van Angracht.33 This strategy was not atypical in the mercantile 
communities and Trivellato has identified the same device among the Iberian Jews of Livorno.34 
Mercantile correspondence was frequently controlled by the authorities in particular during 
warfare.35 Therefore, it was imperative to mislead the authorities if the letters were intercepted. 
Moreover, at the time it was possibly safer to pretend to be a Dutch merchant in Spain than French. 
Indeed, the Spanish government had issued a pragmatica (decree) forcing all French merchants to 
move at least 20 leagues from the harbour of Cadiz.36 ‘Van Holstein’, alias Butler, from Cadiz 
supervised the shipping of Spanish fruit, wine and French fabrics. The goods were moved very 
cautiously, resorting to neutral vessels, mainly Swedish but also Polish and Venetian.37 Dutch and 
English privateers were a constant threat off the Spanish coasts. Moreover, the Spanish authorities 
supervised the arrival and departure of the American fleets, protecting their precious cargo of silver, 
gold and West-Indian dyes. From Spain these raw materials and bullion were then exchanged for 
north-European manufactures.38 Butler directed shipments to England, Holland and Genoa. He used 
different vessels in order to minimise risks and he relied on Swedish and Danish vessels for moving 
the products, but Italian ships to send the letters to his uncle. ‘Van Angracht’ received tonnes of 
fruit and cinnamon and sent back fabrics and letters with detailed instructions.39 They ran different 
transactions at the same time, moving cargoes between the north and the south of Europe, the west 
and the Levant. The most important thing was to keep the wheels of commerce spinning.  
In these times of crisis, Aylward tested his skills to profit and his ability to survive the political 
turmoil. From his papers it seems his trade was carried on mainly through privateering during the 
nine years-conflict. This device was somehow legitimate as both parties waged a commercial war. 
However, confusion with piracy was frequent as both seized commercial vessels. Officially, they 
both targeted the enemy’s cargo, but in times of international turmoil anyone could easily turn into 
prey. During the last decade of the seventeenth century, privateering became a common practice. A 
simple letter of marque would be enough for a captain to act as a privateer and introduce the seized 
vessels into his own port. Therefore, Aylward and his partners, although affected by these assaults, 
resorted to them as well. France and England tacitly approved and sponsored licensed piracy against 
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the enemies’ merchant shipping.40 Nevertheless, trade between England and France was not 
legitimate. 
In 1691 Aylward started corresponding with Charles Horde, another Protestant associate based in 
London. Brailsford died in 1691- in one of the letters Aylward was informed of his funeral in 
Lothbury Parish Church, ironically for a businessman, the closest church to the Bank of England. 
Between the winter of 1691 to the summer of 1692 Aylward and Horde exchanged a vast 
correspondence in which they discussed policies, vessels and from whom to seek protection.41 Their 
collaboration is emblematic of how Aylward survived these difficult times. For pursuing profit any 
tactic was deemed legitimate. Solidarity and excellent skills were fundamental in these 
circumstances as they needed to be cautious not only about the commodities but also the vessels 
employed. The right documents were vital for smooth transactions. Horde had contacts among the 
port officials and thanks to their cooperation, he introduced Aylward’s Jamaican indigo from 
France. They were extremely cautious and always insured the cargoes under Horde’s name. At the 
time, Jamaican indigo was in high demand since imports from Jamaica had stopped after the terrible 
earthquake of 1692.42 The indigo still available in Europe increased greatly in value. The deals were 
extremely lucrative and Aylward resorted to any strategy in order to exploit them. Bribes, goods 
exchanged for prisoners, staging of false assaults- anything was adopted with Horde.43 
Again exchanges were made through privateers. The tactics already tested with Brailsford were 
refined and improved. They frequently bought English-seized vessels in France, any small ‘toole’ 
that could be bought reasonably. They collected accurate information about the content, the marks 
on the merchandise, the names of captains and vessels, and from where it had departed. They would 
unload the English merchandise and load the same amount of French goods. Then the vessel would 
return to England where after ‘much pain’ and ‘50 guineas’ it would surely pass the control in the 
customhouse.44  
Meanwhile the hostilities between France and England escalated. In July 1692, frequent letters were 
exchanged discussing how James II had threatened England with a possible ‘reinthroning’ 
supported by the great army of Louis XIV. Furthermore, an English army of 20,000 men was ready 
to depart from Portsmouth directed to France. Therefore, Aylward and Horde stopped the direct 
exchange from France to England and moved the French goods first to Amsterdam and from there 
to any English port.45 
The most striking aspect of the Aylward-Horde correspondence is how they constantly honed their 
tactics. Each exchange needed a different strategy and in each letter Aylward and his partners 
mapped out all the different possibilities. They accurately considered all the different routes, how to 
11 
 
procure the goods, and which vessels they would deploy. Any tactic was deemed legitimate and 
resorting to privateering was possibly one of the safest plans in times of warfare. Probably it was 
the only opportunity offered to merchants at the time as commercial interests defied diplomacy.46 In 
fact, France, not disposing of a competitive navy, always adopted the guerre de course against 
England.47 The English government itself did not despise this strategy. In fact, although French 
goods were banned in 1689, in 1692 it became possible to introduce them as prizes and a percentage 
of the proceeds would have been for the Crown. This new legislation offered splendid opportunities 
to Aylward to introduce French goods to London by faking seizure. His English associates, 
themselves privateers, exchanged his goods for their own with forged passes obtained through 
friends and bribes. English goods were usually introduced in France through Dunkirk and Brest 
where the seized English and Dutch vessels would be brought.48 
All these plans and personal contacts paired with great abilities proved worth the risk as during the 
first years of the hostilities, Aylward’s business was extremely lucrative. During this time, Aylward 
dealt directly with the contacts previously established in Spain. After 1688, English Protestant 
partners proved vital as they allowed profitable exchanges. Their religion did not prevent successful 
collaborations. The strategies adopted by Aylward testify to his ability to resort to any means in 
order to continue his trade. Despite the political turmoil he was aware that French goods were still 
in high demand; therefore, he traded them. In these difficult times, it was essential to work with 
skilled partners, whether Catholic or not. This did not mean a complete disregard of Catholic ties, 
however, the associates had to be competent, audacious and reliable. Every single process of the 
transaction had to be accurately planned. There was no room for error; therefore, partners were 
carefully selected. Aylward worked and trusted Brailsford and Horde as they were based in London 
and shared the same interests in organising risky but potentially lucrative deals. However, these 
partnerships coexisted with the deals Aylward carried on with his family, which in those 
circumstances proved surprisingly competent. Aylward did not prioritise familial or religious 
networks, but used them on occasion. His aim was to meet the market’s needs even though this 
meant privateering or smuggling. In the quest for profits he worked with anyone deemed capable.  
The Aylward papers during the Nine Years War offer a clear picture of how merchants were forced 
to sustain trade. The traditional routes and systems were disrupted and privateering seemed the only 
option available. The French ports of St Malo and Dunkirk figured as prominent centres. James II 
and Louis XIV financed this practice against the English Navy and merchant shipping, in actuality 
gaining a tenth of the profits.49 On the other side, the English government tacitly approved, with the 
Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey playing a prominent role. In the literature Aylward has 
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been mentioned among the Jacobite privateers that smuggled English goods, men and information 
to support James II’s cause.50 However, Aylward never mentioned any political or religious 
ambition besides his deals. His partners were certainly non-Catholic and judging by the scornful 
comments about James II, it is reasonable to assume that they were not sympathetic of the Catholic 
cause either. Aylward’s tactics contribute to our understing of how privateering in the Channel 
functioned at the time. Furthermore, he defies the theory that British Catholic privateers would act 
solely in support of Jacobitism. In actuality, in England, Aylward was suspected of Jacobite 
activities, but his friends testified that although during the Glorious Revolution he was in France, he 
was never in the service of King James II.51 His trading strategy reflects the economic rationale of 
other religious minorities in trade in early modern times. During the seventeenth century, commerce 
expanded but it was still highly unregulated. Legal systems were slowly emerging but merchants 
had to act quickly and the only option was to rely on personal contacts worth of trust, whether 
religious, familial or economic.  
 
II 
Aylward arrived in London as an established merchant with a great deal of experience, resources 
and contacts. In 1698 he had been in business for almost thirty years in which he had learned how to 
trade. Religion and outstanding skills enabled him to thrive, whereas with experience came the 
ability to recognise the most reliable partners and how to act in commerce. Once in London, after 
the years spent in Malaga and St Malo, Aylward was able to single out the best men, whether family 
or not, to know the best goods in which to invest and which were the best strategies to adopt. In 
fact, all the tactics previously learned and tested, became more imaginative and effective. In the 
1680s and 1690s Aylward resorted to his religion, family and numerous partners, whereas in 
London he would coordinate his operations by only using a few traders strategically placed. These 
last years would be the culmination of his career and shows how, once again, Catholicism helped to 
secure successful deals. 
The contacts previously established in Spain and France were not however severed. In France 
various letters were sent to Rouen, St Malo, Bordeaux and Paris, where Aylward could still count 
on family, friends and Catholic expatriates, whereas in Spain he relied mainly on a few counting 
houses and skilled partners. Nevertheless, what is certain is that he selected and treasured only the 
best commercial ties. In fact, during these years his correspondence would be exchanged with a few 
partners, such as Paul Den, Julien Grant and the firm Woulfe & Trublet. This counting house was 
part of his wife’s dowry. The associate Trublet, ‘a fine and modest man’, was the first husband of 
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Helena, Aylward’s wife.52 This firm was based in Cadiz but it had contacts in all the major Atlantic 
and Mediterranean ports. In the 1690s, this vast circle of traders allowed Aylward to survive and 
thrive and in times of warfare these contacts proved crucial; by disregarding religions, nationalities, 
and by acting ‘merely for money’ these men assured the endurance of Aylward’s business.  
In the previous decades, religion had been important in securing a foothold in trade and for planning 
trading schemes, however, during the Spanish war it proved fundamental for accessing Catholic 
Spain and France, which were off limits to English or Protestant merchants. In this last phase of 
Aylward’s career, Catholicism fundamentally sustained his business. Being based in London and 
accessing other European markets, meant for Aylward the advantage of dealing with both 
contenders and the possibility to negotiate from a privileged position.  
In fact, unlike during the Nine Years War when only French goods were illegal, from 1701 even 
Spanish products were banned by the English government. Indeed, in 1700 the death of the 
childless Charles II in Spain opened serious dynastic issues. His designated heir was the Duke of 
Anjou Philipp V, Louis XIV’s grandson, and although in his testament Charles II had declared that 
the thrones of Spain and France be separate, the Dutch and the British did not tolerate this 
settlement. The English and the Dutch allies were not necessarily worried for the Spanish throne 
itself, but feared they would no longer be able to access the riches of the Spanish Empire.53 The 
threat was that the Spanish and French joint fleet would block British access to the Mediterranean 
and a possible French Netherlands would have hindered access to the continental markets as well. 
Once again, French hegemonic pretentions triggered a decade of international turmoil and major 
disruption to trade that had not yet recovered from the previous European conflict.54 Privateering 
once more was the only option for traders as the Spanish market was closed, the Baltic uncertain, 
and the French corsairs loomed in the Channel.55 Therefore, Aylward needed to devise the grandest 
strategies to run his exchanges and to overcome these problems. Although initially he considered to 
introducing goods directly from France, he soon abandoned this plan when the English government 
implemented privateering policies in 1702, declaring that privateers would now retain the pillage 
and have a better share of the prizes.56  
Therefore, since trading across the Channel was no longer the safest option, Aylward looked at 
Portugal, England’s ally, and diverted all his French and Spanish goods there.57 To this end, 
Aylward first moved French goods to Spain. Second, French commodities would join Spanish ones 
and then all the merchandise would be moved to Portugal where partners would ship them to 
England. Indeed, when a new deal was opened Aylward would start sending letters to his partners in 
St Malo, Rouen and Paris. The goods usually reached Marseilles and from there they went to Spain 
14 
 
and Portugal. Finally, the partners moving between Malaga, Port St Mary and Cartagena would 
introduce the French and Spanish goods to Portugal, mainly Faro and Lisbon.58 The smuggling 
process was basic but a vast amount of capital, men and resources were involved. The goods were 
shipped on Hamburg, Scandinavian or English vessels. With pseudonyms, Aylward and his partners 
covered the shipments and signed the correspondence. These measures were taken in order to avoid 
any French or Spanish hint and pretend all the exchanges were controlled by English merchants 
resorting to English vessels and crews. Vast networks of co-religionists, relatives and loyal non-
Catholic partners assured the transactions. For this reason, the support of the mercantile community 
was essential, but Catholicism would always be the key as it allowed Aylward to deal with Catholic 
countries. In fact, Aylward was aware of his advantage over his Protestant partners and for this 
reason he made sure to seize this opportunity. Therefore, he accurately selected the best contacts 
from the French and the Spanish markets and resorted to the best tactics and men disregarding their 
religion; however, he was always aware that his faith was crucial in the survival of the business. In 
all these exchanges Aylward always showed a clear business knowledge and shrewdness in 
organising his cargo. He tapped into Catholic networks and blood ties to secure the goods needed 
and to import the merchandise into the enemies’ docks. Thirdly, he resorted to nationality and the 
mercantile community to ship the products towards England, but not necessarily London.59 During 
the war, the English ports facing the Channel were to some extent all involved in smuggling and 
Aylward’s goods would mainly come through Portsmouth or Bristol. From there they were moved 
and dispatched in London. 
During these years, Aylward mainly worked with Paul Den. Den was an associate of Woulfe & 
Trublet and he was an old acquaintance. During the previous decades there was no significant 
collaboration between them. However, during the War of the Spanish Succession, this agent proved 
fundamental in suggesting strategies and choosing partners since he was mainly based in Portugal. 
The vast amount of goods mentioned in their letters suggests that their association was extremely 
successful, moving tonnes of commodities, from food to silks. However, the tactics discussed are 
the most interesting aspect. Aylward and Den had a clear grasp of the vicissitudes of trade and a 
clear awareness of the political situation. During the Spanish war they introduced goods to England 
from Portuguese or Italian ports, using vessels from Hamburg or Sweden. They resorted to 
pseudonyms or acted under the cover of trusted friends, mainly John Goold of Lisbon or the 
Creaghs in Amsterdam, both prominent Catholic Jacobites involved in smuggling.60  
In Portugal the French and Spanish goods were exchanged for English goods shipped from London. 
The letters, however, were never shipped with the merchandise and would reach Aylward through 
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France or Portugal. Judging from the long accounts, Aylward’s gains were enormous, even in times 
in which everyone complained that ‘no money was stirring.’61 Den’s organisational skills proved 
fundamental, allowing Aylward to smuggle goods into England and to load the Spanish vessels with 
English manufactures. The merchandise was primarily introduced from Portugal, however, they 
often resorted to vessels from Hamburg that could enter England and move freely between England 
and Portugal with regular stops in Spanish ports. Den was well aware of the political events and in 
such circumstances, he knew prospects could be grim. Therefore, specific trading strategies were 
needed to succeed. Indeed, he believed that trading through Hamburg would have been a good 
solution, until at least 1703 when Hamburg ‘declared for the Emperor’, losing its neutrality.62 After 
that Den thought it would be safer to deploy Scandinavian or Italian ships. 
Den proved a trustworthy agent, constantly moving around the Iberian commercial cities of 
Antequera, Port St Mary, Malaga, Cadiz and Faro. He was an acute observer of the market, always 
informing Aylward when best to sell or keep merchandise. He always provided detailed accounts of 
exchange rates and price fluctuations. When dealing with textiles, he recommended which colour 
was best in which to invest, according to the season and the fashion. They sometimes worked with 
long-term partners or with Aylward’s family. However, the majority of the transactions were 
supervised by the firm of Woulfe & Trublet.63 As the hostilities between England, France and Spain 
continued, in 1703 Den’s and Aylward’s strategies became more diligent. Den, for instance 
supervised all the shipments, using neutral fishing vessels. These vessels were used in clandestine 
traffic because they were small, usually no more than 20 or 30 tonnes, so as to be easy to 
manoeuvre into busy ports.64 They were also cheaper than the usual commercial ships, in order to 
lead to fewer losses in case of seizure. Like in the previous decade, smuggled goods were moved by 
fishing boats, taking advantage of the availability of fishermen eager to continue a trade that the war 
had disrupted.65 
Furthermore, the possibility to use fishing boats gave Aylward the opportunity to diversify his 
ventures at times when the situation was escalating. In fact, any Dutch or English vessel 
approaching the cost of Spain or Portugal was in serious danger. The vessels were attacked, the 
merchandise seized and the crew imprisoned. For instance, Den reported on an English ship that 
was seized while coming from Livorno, containing 23 bales of silk, wine and rice. The goods were 
taken and two members of the crew killed and the captain maltreated by the ‘galleys’ [privateering 
vessel] soldiers who ‘left him no more than what he had on his back’.66 In Spain, the trading 
officials ‘visited’ all the merchant houses, leaving guards to prevent illicit dealings.67 Apparently 
Den’s movements around the commercial cities of Antequera, Cartagena and Faro raised suspicions 
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and he was taken prisoner for three days, on suspicion of trading in Spanish goods through 
Portugal. Fortunately, he had taken ‘some precaution’, having previously been informed about the 
control and since the authorities did not find anything, he was set free on bail.68 Den feared trading 
for him would soon be difficult and although there was no interceptions of letters yet, he became 
extremely cautious in writing about specific matters. It was time to resort to safer strategies and to 
adopt even more secure measures for assuring trade. Therefore, he started to protect his identities 
with nicknames. Den started to sign the letters with various names, calling himself Parento 
Maquing, Lorenzo Baptista or Peter Jackson.69 Had the Spanish authorities sifted through the mail, 
they would have not caught him or Aylward. Later in the year, writing as Anthony Mosset, Den 
informed Aylward that their goods were ready in Cadiz, possibly loaded on the transatlantic vessels, 
but these could not sail since the English and Dutch were off the Spanish coast, ready to hinder any 
transatlantic deals.70  
After disclosing his worries about the situation in Spain, the correspondence between Aylward and 
Den shows a sudden shift in trading activities with Italian ports. The Mediterranean still played a 
crucial role in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, despite the Atlantic commercial 
expansion. It was not cut off from the riches and the power struggles that followed the dramatic 
expansion of European commerce.71 In fact, many of the goods which supplied the Spanish-
American vessels or were exchanged for English fabrics were Mediterranean products. Indeed, 
Aylward worked with Livorno that at the time was the most important port in the region as its 
pragmatic religious and economic policies suited the interests of various nationalities and religious 
minorities. The possibility to pay low custom duties and to practice one’s religion freely was almost 
unique in the Italian peninsula or in any other European port. In establishing contacts, Aylward was 
possibly facilitated by his Catholicism and his interests touched not only Livorno, but also Genoa 
and Marseilles from where it was possible to purchase Levantine goods. In the winter months of 
1702-1703 Den moved frequently between Italian and French ports. Initially, he complained that no 
money was ‘stirring’ and nobody was buying wine or fruit. English ships were not in sight and sales 
were extremely dull. Nevertheless, prospects improved when the Hamburg convoys started arriving 
in the spring, followed by Portuguese ships from Faro and Lisbon. The goods purchased there could 
then be moved to Spain or England. In fact, the Italian ports secured cargo that could safely go to 
London. There was plenty of fruit and sweet wines to be shipped, and the vessels could sail through 
Faro and Lisbon or any other way Aylward ‘shall judge best’.72 
The English presence in the Italian ports was common particularly in the late seventeenth century 
when the Venetian decline promoted English incursion.73 Like any other British merchant of the 
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time, Den worked in the Italian ports, especially Livorno. The Italian deals seemed to show the 
desire to mitigate potential losses by trading in neutral areas, however the business accounts soon 
clearly showed that these exchanges did not involve just Italian merchandise. Indeed, Den 
frequently went from Livorno to Marseilles, where French goods were exchanged for wine and fruit 
and were loaded on Hamburg or Swedish vessels.74 From the Italian ports, French goods were 
bound for Portugal, Holland or Sweden and ‘if there can be a way’ they also went to England.75 
Therefore, it becomes clear that this new focus was just one of several strategies used to introduce 
French goods into English ports. In fact, English vessels could not load in France and many 
cautious traders were against these dealings since they deemed them too hazardous; however ‘since 
a man cannot say what it is the best to do’ Den thought it was worth trying. He mainly used 
Genoese ships bound for Marseilles, thinking they were secure enough. Portugal was ‘the only 
place all people aim(s)’ to go and his vessels would have touched there.76 Clearly, these designs 
were dangerous and before organising the cargo, they needed assurances from their partners in Faro, 
considering that they were not only smuggling French goods to London, but also introducing 
English products to France. None of these schemes were legitimate and the consequences could 
have been detrimental. From France and Italy Aylward purchased a vast amount of commodities, 
while Den juggled the business between the south of France and the north-Italian ports.   
At the beginning of 1703 the hostilities escalated and it became crucial for Aylward that their 
strategies to be as accurate as possible because of the dangerous nature of these vast exchanges. 
Moreover, the agents involved had to be carefully selected. Indeed, in one of the many letters 
Aylward was introduced by Den to a ‘trusty Spanish gentleman’.77 This trader supervised the 
movement of English goods from Portugal to Fuengirola, in the south of Spain, where a man 
‘would come ashore’ and facilitate the transaction with Spanish goods. The name of this trader 
could not be mentioned but Den assured he was a good friend and he ‘could inform very well of 
him’.78 For the exchange, Den encouraged Aylward to send the English long ells of good quality 
and ‘without any English leads’ which were in high demand in the Spanish market. The goods for 
which these fabrics were exchanged were procured by Den from the province of Malaga, in 
particular fruit. In one transaction Den shipped 600 or 700 barrels of fresh fruit.79 In actuality, they 
were forced to deal with what was available as many commodities were scarce or forbidden, such as 
Spanish and French wines. Nevertheless, they constantly considered all the options in order to make 
a profit, or at least to minimise potential losses. They mainly focused on fruit and wines, but 
sometimes they loaded their cargoes with barrels of buckles and pewter buttons. Placing the 
merchandise was not an easy task either and all this scheming was worthwhile only for goods of the 
finest quality. The last couple of years saw a vast correspondence, exchanged in order to make the 
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plans as effective as possible. Aylward’s and Den’s names disappeared from the letters, signed only 
with fanciful names.80 For forwarding the letters they resorted to more than a few merchants so to 
minimise risks and not to raise any suspicions.81 Their smuggling activities extended widely across 
European waters and they shed light on how merchants kept the wheels of commerce spinning in 
those twenty years of warfare. 
The collaboration with Paul Den represents the peak of John Aylward’s career. The ability to 
survive these last years of warfare proved outstanding and stemmed from years of experience, the 
strategic use of Catholicism and various partners. Aylward deftly used the resources available, from 
familial networks and identity, to the various traders he met throughout his career. The work with 
Den is emblematic of how Catholicism and family played a crucial role in developing his business. 
In fact, Den was introduced by Aylward’s wife’s networks; however, the partnership was solely 
based on mutual trust and common interests, and there was never mentioning of religion. Den 
proved crucial in organising the smuggling schemes and in accurately planning every single detail, 
whereas Catholicism allowed Aylward to access various markets and countries. The collaboration 
with Den exemplifies how Aylward was initially helped by family and survived thanks to his 
abilities and religious identity. Furthermore, in London, Aylward’s partnerships strengthen the 
theory that Catholic merchants moved beyond their religious borders, trading with anyone deemed 
reliable and trustworthy. Aylward needed partners placed in strategic commercial centres, able to 
inform him about what the market wanted and to provide the best merchandise. In times of warfare, 
being able to supply the most requested goods, despite the difficulties, was crucial for surviving in 
business. Smuggling, using false identities and accessing different countries were the only options 
offered at the time, and Aylward resorted to these tactics, like any other merchant willing to survive 
the warfare. However, his activities were more outstanding because of his religion. As previously 
mentioned, instead of representing an impairment, Catholicism proved fundamental at this stage. 
Nevertheless, excellent trading skills also proved essential for assuring the continuity of the 
activities. Therefore, the work with Den typifies how Aylward established himself as a merchant 
knowing that survival would be assured not only by his excellent trading abilities, but most of all by 
his Catholicism. 
III 
The years in St Malo and London showed Aylward’s ability to resort to a range of tactics and to tap 
into different networks. Although no longer in Spain, Aylward continued to be involved in the 
Anglo-Spanish trade and to supply the transatlantic vessels in Cadiz. The flota and the galleons 
needed European manufactured goods to exchange for American bullion and West-Indian raw 
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materials. The ability to meet these needs assured great profits. Particularly French and Spanish 
fruit and wines were highly requested in England and the north of Europe in exchange for fabrics 
and tools to ship to the Americas. Therefore, Aylward’s ability to fuel this trade ensured his 
success. He used his Catholic contacts to acquire Spanish and French goods and Protestant partners 
to introduce them into England. Aylward adopted diverse strategies to survive European warfare. 
His most successful deals were planned with skilled merchants that were chosen without regard for 
nationality and religion. Aylward was part of Catholic communities of expatriates in Cadiz and St 
Malo and among his contacts there were renowned Jacobites that fervently supported the Catholic 
cause and James II’s privateering designs. Nonetheless, Aylward never showed any involvement in 
Jacobite activities or never appeared to be devout. Perhaps he was like any other seamen of the 
time, ‘showing no manner of respect to God’;82 he never mentioned his private beliefs and his 
religious ties coexisted with other economic connections. As recent scholars have clearly shown, 
the early modern commercial world was too vast to be controlled and resorting to wider networks 
was the only possibility to survive.83 This did not imply denying one’s religious beliefs but simply 
adopting a pragmatic attitude. Aylward regarded religion and nationality as assets to use as 
opportunities on the market place. His mercantile behaviour proved perfectly standard, like any 
other merchant involved in transatlantic commerce. Aylward, as part of a religious minority, 
possibly was forced into commerce because of exclusion from public offices; nonetheless, he was 
not communal and with his career, he proved that even Catholics could be successful entrepreneurs, 
influenced by ‘the Spirit of Capitalism’.84 The aim is not to discuss Weber’s assumptions on 
enterprise and success, however, Aylward fits perfectly in recent theories that suggest that more 
than the Protestant ethos, it was the social and political context that ensured success and promoted 
enterprise.85  
On the 24th of April 1705, John Aylward died in London. He had been in trade for almost thirty 
years and was aware of how commerce worked. He worked in all the major European-Atlantic ports 
and his engagement might have been fortuitous, but he nevertheless assured great fortunes. In fact, 
in the early 1700s, he retired in his country retreat on the outskirts of London and spent the springs 
in Bath as expected from any wealthy gentleman of the time. His is a story of economic integration 
and success. The Protestant others worked with him. Perhaps, the mercantile community showed 
connivance towards his Catholicism, nevertheless it was inclusive. It allowed Aylward to prosper 
and to adapt to the most diverse circumstances. Over his Protestant associates, he had the advantage 
of dealing with the Catholic enemies. He was sought after by his partners because they needed him 
to procure the highly requested French and Spanish goods. Certainly at the end of the seventeenth 
century English Catholicism was not facing rehabilitation; but Aylward did not experience 
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intolerance in the mercantile community. As any merchant belonging to a religious minority he 
worked with family and co-religionists; however, he was not communal and he closed the best deals 
with non-Catholics. Aylward made great use of all his ties as long as they offered access to various 
markets. He smuggled because this was one of the few options for traders at time of warfare. His 
career suggests a tale of social and economic integration. The early modern commercial world was 
too vast to be controlled and ‘it encouraged new conversations between strangers’.86 Aylward 
trusted only the mercantile values and his dealings had not political or religious influence. In his 
lifelong pursuit of wealth, he was an ordinary merchant, who had an extraordinary career. 
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were also exchanged between England, Spain and France. 
59 AY 30, f. 32, Business Correspondence Letters to John Aylward from Paul Den at Malaga, one from Cadiz and one 
from St Malo, June 1685-Nov. 1703; Monod, “Dangerous Merchandise,” 154. 
60 Monod, “Dangerous Merchandise”, 170. 
61 AY 30, f. 30, Business Correspondence, Letters to John Aylward from Paul Den at Malaga, one from Cadiz and one 
from St Malo, June 1685-Nov. 1703. 
62  Bromley, “The North Sea in Wartime”, 53. Hamburg’s role in the Spanish war was always ambivalent, a wolf in 
sheep’s clothes as Bromley defined it. In fact, although siding with the allies, the local authorities never enforced the 
prohibition on trade with the enemy. In actuality, Hamburg constantly traded with France and Spain.  
63 AY 30, f. 19, Business Correspondence. Den loaded 30 butts of wine, 315 barrels of raisins, and other 233 barrels of 
wine at 4 pounds sterling per tonne.  
64 Cullen, “The Smuggling Trade in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century”, 151. 
65 Moreiux, “The Fisherman, Friend of All Nations?”, 211-247. 
66 Bromley, “The French Privateering War”, 170, The small vessels called Galleys were mainly used by the French; AY 
30, f. 40, Business Correspondence, Some merchants left for fear of persecution. AY 30 f. 39. Den mentions the cedula 
granted by the King of Spain, on which he had to register. Some of their friends found shelter in the churches. 
67 Ibid, 337. Bromley, “French Traders in the South Sea”, 325-338: Bromley argues that Spanish officials connived at 
the law’s evasion however we should not overemphasise their venality as not everyone was willing to break the law 
even for a bribe. 
68 AY 30, f. 38, Business Correspondence, On the 13th May 1702, English and Dutch merchants and goods were 
embargoed in Spain. Two English seamen were killed. The English ship taken was The Expectation. ‘There is so much 
rigour even though war has not been declared, can you imagine what will happen when it is declared’; AY 30, f. 34, 
Business Correspondence, The Spanish market was greatly affected and there were no prospects for the sale of oil. Den 
also tried his best to dispose of the textile bays. It is probable that ships bound for the Levant would have taken them. In 
the meantime, they waited for the incoming of the flota. Aylward was impatient about the arrival of the American vessels, 
because he had invested in some commodities shipped to Jamaica and he needed to enquire about wine and ‘vellon’. 
69 AY 30, f. 62, f. 66, f. 68, Letter of Paul Den, signed Nicholas Baptista of Sandonat. In f. 54 Den was called Lorenzo 
Baptista. In f. 50 Den’s alias was Andreas Ferrar. In f. 48 he signed Parentius Baptista; AY 30, f. 42, Business 
Correspondence, Parento Maquing wrote from Leghorn. In f. 40, Peter Jackson wrote from Malaga. 
70 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, 169: The allies were interested in Gibraltar for its strategic position, and 
skirmishes ensued off Malaga. In general both parties were interested in the commerce in Cadiz; AY 30, f. 41, Business 
Correspondence, An army of 15,000 had landed in Spain. ‘you may judge in what consternation the poor merchants and 
the inhabitants are in’. ‘I have all thing packd up in order to send them into the country in case they should bomb’. 
71 Trivellato, “The Port Jews of Livorno”; Fusaro, Political Economies of Empire. 
72 AY 30, f. 42, Business Correspondence, The partners involved were Mr Carter, Mr Persival and March, advised by 
Mr Willmot. They covered the letters and were based in Lisbon. 
73 Fusaro, Political Economies of Empire. 
74 AY 30, f. 44, Business Correspondence. 
75 AY 30, f. 43, Business Correspondence, Den is writing as Parentius Baptista, on the 21st Oct 1702. 
76 AY 30, f. 43, Business Correspondence, Letter from Marseilles. 
77 AY 30, f. 62, Business Correspondence, Den is writing as Nicholas Baptista di Sandonat. 
78 AY 30, f. 62, Business Correspondence, Letter of 12th June 1703. Den thought ‘being no convenient’ to mention the 
name of the merchant. 
79 AY 30, f. 62, Business Correspondence. 
80 AY 30, f. 62, Business Correspondence. In this letter Den was Nicholas Baptista di Sandonat. 
81 AY 30, f. 66, Business Correspondence; AY 30, f. 68, Business Correspondence. 
82 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, 215. 
83 Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers; Haggerty, ‘Merely for Money?’. 
84 Tolles. Meeting House and Counting House. Poggi. Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit. 
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